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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order revoking probation and imposing a life 
sentence. Relief should be granted because there was insufficient evidence to prove 
Count II of the probation violation allegations and it is unlikely that the court 
would have revoked probation absent that violation. Moreover, even had Count II 
been proved, the court still abused its discretion in revoking probation and imposing 
the sentence. 
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
1. Sentencing proceedings 
Wesly Standley pleaded guilty to a charge of Possession of Heroin with the 
Intent to Deliver. (Count II.) Count I (Trafficking in Heroin) and Count III 
(Possession of Methamphetamine) were dismissed, along with a notice to seek an 
enhanced penalty under LC.§ 37-2732(a)(l)(A) and a persistent violator allegation. 
R 115-118 (Amended Information); 124 (Court's Minutes); 140 (Order). 
A PSI was ordered by the court. The report revealed that Mr. Standley was 
44 years old, and had a long history of substance abuse starting with a minor in 
possession of alcohol conviction when he was eighteen years old. After that, he had 
three other alcohol related misdemeanor convictions and a delivery of a controlled 
substance conviction before he turned 21. At 24, he pleaded guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance and resisting/obstructing officers and was placed on probation. 
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Eventually, his probation was revoked, in part because of another possession 
of a controlled substance conviction. While in IDOC custody, he was indicted in 
federal court for being a felon in possession of a firearm and for possession of heroin 
and methamphetamine for events occurring prior to his IDOC commitment. He 
pleaded guilty to the firearm possession count and was paroled by Idaho to his 
federal detainer. He was released from federal custody on 2008, successfully 
completed his federal community supervision requirement, and was released from 
federal supervision in 2011. 
On January 27, 2014, Mr. Standley's home was searched pursuant to a 
warrant. The police found syringes, including two loaded with dissolved heroin, a 
plastic bag with 1.3 grams of heroin, 1.6 grams of methamphetamine, some 
marijuana, additional drug paraphernalia, and $1248 in cash. Mr. Standley 
admitted to the police that he would travel to Utah to buy heroin, some of which he 
would sell to other users. 
While on pre-trial release, Mr. Standley entered into a drug addiction 
treatment program, supervised by David Hadlock, M.D., which consisted of three 
phases. Dr. Hadlock, who is board certified in addiction medicine and holds a 
Master's Degree in addiction counseling, also included Suboxone in the treatment 
program. T pg. 8, ln 3-13; pg. 9, ln. 1. Suboxone is a medication for those who are 
addicted to opiates. It contains a synthetic opiate (buprenorphine) and a second 
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drug (naltrexone) that is designed to counteract the euphoric effect of the opiate. 
is designed to stop drug cravings, while at the same time preventing the 
user from getting high either from the synthetic opiate or from other opiates. T pg. 
15, In. 11 - pg. 16, ln. 25; pg. 23, ln. 2-13. 
The first phase was the Intensive Outpatient Treatment program. The IOP 
required 30 group sessions, each lasting three hours, over a IO-week session, with at 
least five sessions of individual counseling. T pg. 26, ln. 13-25. The Relapse 
Prevention program lasted 12 weeks and the Aftercare Program was ongoing with 
group sessions and individual counseling. T pg. 27, ln. 8-22. Mr. Standley also 
attended NA meetings. T pg. 31, ln. 1-16. Dr. Hadlock testified that Mr. Standley 
"basically has done everything I could possibly could have asked him to do in 
regards to reprogramming." T pg. 14, ln. 24-25. 
The state recommended a twelve-year sentence with four years fixed. Of 
importance to this appeal, it noted that "we do not believe that [a life sentence] is 
something that is appropriate[.]" T pg. 40, ln. 5-23. Mr. Standley asked the court to 
impose a stricter sentence of twelve years with nine years of that fixed, but to grant 
him one chance by suspending the sentence and granting probation. T pg. 40, ln. 
14-24 .. 
The court, noting that neither party was going to "like this sentence" imposed 
the maximum sentence of life imprisonment with 15 years fixed and the maximum 
fine of $25,000, suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Standley on ten years 
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probation. T pg. 51, ln. 8-12; R 167. The court imposed what might be called a "one 
and done" probation. It noted that, "This is an all or nothing sentence for Wesly 
Standley, because I am of the firm belief, Mr. Standley, that if you go back to using 
drugs, you will go back to dealing, and we will be right back here again." T pg. 54, 
ln. 20-23. The court continued, "So hear out what I'm saying here. You come back 
on a probation violation, you're gone." T pg. 55, In. 11-12. 
One of the general conditions of probation was that Mr. Standley "shall not 
associate with any person(s) designated by any agent of IDOC." R 176. Another 
general condition required Mr. Standley to "meaningfully participate in and 
successfully complete any treatment, counseling or other programs deemed 
beneficial to the Defendant and as directed by the Court or any agent of the IDOC." 
R 17 4. The court also imposed several special terms of probation, one of which 
required that: 
The defendant shall complete the Suboxene program that he is 
currently enrolled in through Dr. David R. Hadlock's office. If the 
defendant quits the program prior to the completion date as 
recommended by Dr. Hadlock, such conduct shall constitute a 
probation violation. 
R 168; T pg. 58, ln. 8-11. 
The court stated that, "I'm here to tell you, Mr. Standley, that is, in fact, a 
zero-tolerance probation." It concluded: 
Here's the things that will get you in trouble: Obviously using alcohol, 
it's a trigger; using any drugs, that's clearly going to violate you; 
associating with people you shouldn't associate with .... Your 
probation officer has the authority to tell you who to not associate 
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with. 
ln. 13-20. There was no objection to the zero-tolerance provision and Mr. 
Standley accepted the terms of the probation. T pg. 58, In. 25 - pg. 59, ln. 9. No 
Notice of Appeal was filed from the judgment and sentence. 
2. Probation violation proceedings 
The state filed a motion to revoke probation alleging two probation violations. 
Count I alleged that Mr. Standley had "unapproved contact with Danielle Schreiner 
and Matt Lewis, who are both under IDOC supervision." R 191. Count II alleged 
that he was "failing to take his Suboxene medication as prescribed. And therefore 
failing to participate in the Suboxene Program with Dr. Hadlock as ordered by the 
Court." R 191. Mr. Standley entered a denial to those allegations. R 207. 
(a) Count I 
Probation Officer Frank Neumeyer testified that during a probationary 
search of Mr. Standley's home, another P.O. noted some "odd texts" on a cell phone 
"that just didn't seem right." T pg. 63, ln. 12-14. Mr. Standley told P.O. Neumeyer 
that they were from Danielle Schreiner and that he had in-person contact with her 
too. Ms. Schrenier was on probation and a participant in Drug Court. The cell 
phone also showed a phone call to Matt Lewis' number. Mr. Lewis was also on 
probation. T pg. 63, ln. 9-25. Copies of the text messages were admitted into 
evidence. T pg. 67, In. 8-9; State's Exhibit 1. Some of them showed that Mr. 
Standley was aware that Ms. Schrenier was on probation. T pg. 71, In. 20 - pg. 72, 
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In. 4. The text message exchange between them was initiated by her. She texted 
Mr. Standley with the message that she just saw Matt Lewis, who wants to contact 
him. It may be that she is seeking drugs from Mr. Standley for both herself 
(claiming she had hurt her back) and for Mr. Lewis, who she claims "likes the 
opiates big time." Mr. Standley says that she could take a quarter of a strip of 
Suboxene for the pain. State's Exhibit 1 (Evidentiary Hearing). 
The court originally found that Count I had not been proved, noting: 
The provision that is alleged to have been violated is number 24 of the 
general conditions. Mr. Standley acknowledged or says, the defendant 
shall not associate with any persons designated by any agent of IDOC. 
The allegation is that he had unauthorized contact. What's lacking in 
this case is evidence that he was told of this condition, and maybe we 
do this case again. I don't know. That's your choice. But I am not 
going to find that he is in violation of Count 1 because the State has 
simply not presented substantial evidence on that allegation. 
T pg. 112, ln. 4-13. 
After the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the state filed a second Ex 
Parte Motion to Revoke Probation. R 227. The single count alleged that Mr. 
Standley had "unapproved contact with Danielle Schreiner and Matt Lewis, who are 
both known felons and under IDOC supervision." R 228. This allegation was 
substantially similar to the original Count I which alleged that Mr. Standley had 
"unapproved contact with Danielle Schreiner and Matt Lewis, who are both under 
IDOC supervision." R 191. 
This second probation violation proceeding to evidentiary hearing without 
objection from defense counsel. After hearing additional evidence, the court took 
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judicial notice of the general condition of probation #24, which prohibited Mr. 
Standley from associating with any person designated by the IDOC. It continued: 
"lt is undisputed that Alice McClain la probation officer] told Mr. Standley at the 
time he signed up for probation that he was not allowed to associate with any 
known felons, anyone in the speciality courts, or anyone involved in criminal 
conduct without the permission of an IDOC officer." T pg. 157, In. 7-11. Defense 
counsel conceded and the court found that Mr. Standley had prohibited contact with 
Ms. Schriener. It did not find, however, that he had prohibited contact with Mr. 
Lewis. T pg. 157, ln. 19 - pg. 159, ln. 20. 
(b) Count II 
During the search of Mr. Standley's home, the probation officer found that 
Mr. Standley had not been taking all of the Suboxene prescribed to him. During a 
time period where Mr. Standley should have taken 44 strips, only ten were missing 
from his prescription box. When questioned about that, Mr. Standley said that "he 
was trying to wean himself off that prescription." T pg. 73, ln. 24-25. 
Mr. Standley agreed as part of the Suboxene program treatment to take the 
medication only as prescribed and to not skip or adjust the dose on his own. T pg. 
75, ln. 5-12; State's Exhibit 2, pg. 1. 
Dr. Hadlock testified that Mr. Standley had been participating in all 
components of the Suboxene program and that Mr. Standley's performance was 
"phenomenal." T pg. 82, ln. 22. Dr. Hadlock explained that it is "addict behavior" 
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patients "to actually practice medicine on themselves" and part of the goal of 
treatment is "to change that behavior, that's part of the addictive behavior." T pg. 
83, ln. 22 - pg. 84, ln. 4. And, while the treatment agreement requires patients to 
take the medication as prescribed, only about 70% of patients who are required to 
take medications twice a day, as Mr. Standley was, actually do so and 
noncompliance "is a national problem." T pg. 84, ln. 25. 
The doctor noted that Suboxene works so well in stopping the craving 
mechanism that it is not uncommon for patients to forget to take it. Unlike other 
medications, when patients miss a dose of Suboxene they are instructed to not take 
it. "[W]ith Suboxene, if you miss a dose you're instructed specifically don't take the 
dose." T pg. 85, ln. 1-8. The doctor testified that the problem occurs when patients 
use extra strips, not when they miss a strip. "I don't want them to use extra 
without permission. If they forget a strip, that kind of follows the national 
standards. The medication has such a long half life that it will actually stay in their 
system for three days so they won't have withdrawals by missing a strip." T pg. 85, 
ln. 17-22. Missing a strip does not worry the doctor, instead, "I'm worried ... when 
they take extra strips, that would be addict behavior." T pg. 90, ln. 18-20. He noted 
that Mr. Standley could have accumulated the extra strips if he had missed just five 
strips a month of the approximately 60 prescribed for each of the ten months he has 
been in treatment. T pg. 96, ln. 22-25. 
The doctor testified that Mr. Standley was still in his Suboxene program and 
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that special arrangements had been made for him since he was in jail. T pg. 90, ln. 
23-25. There was no evidence presented that Mr. Standley had not meaningfully 
participated in the treatment, notwithstanding the violation of one of the terms of 
the agreement. The doctor explained that the treatment agreement is "not a legal 
document," but is only intended to set out the ground rules for treatment. It is not 
unusual for patients to be noncompliant and the doctor gives them "some latitude" 
when they have violations of the agreement. T pg. 88, ln. 19-20; pg. 89, ln. 4-11. 
When asked if Mr. Standley was non compliant with the program, the doctor 
answered: 
No. That's - all of his urines have been clean for me and for his 
probation officers on a weekly basis. He's attended IOP aftercare, 
relapse prevention. He still was attending community support 
meeting. I wish I could get the rest of my patients to be that compliant 
in the education piece because the medication piece is just a small 
piece. He took to that and was actually leading some of the meetings, 
from what I was told by his counselors. 
T pg. 100, ln. 12-19. 
Nevertheless, the court found that Mr. Standley had violated the special 
condition that he complete Dr. Hadlock's treatment program. The court ruled: 
So there were two components of that order. One component is ifhe 
quits, he violates probation, no question about it. And second, that he 
complete the program. Well, there is no question in my mind that Mr. 
Standley has not followed that program like he was directed. I don't 
care whether Officer Neumeyer thinks it's a violation or not, I don't 
care whether Dr. Hadlock thinks it was a violation or not. And clearly 
failing to follow the prescribed routine of taking two Suboxenes a day 
was the deal. It's not up to Mr. Standley to make that decision. I could 
care less whether 90 percent or a hundred percent of the world failed 
under these programs and failed to follow the instructions. That's not 
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the issue. The issue is you were told what to do. You made a different 
decision. That isn't a medical issue. It is an issue, Mr. Standley, very 
simply that you on your own decided to change the program. That 
violates the probation, and you are, in fact, in violation of probation on 
Count 2. 
T pg. 113, ln. 11 - pg. 114, ln. 3. 
(c) Disposition 
At the dispositional hearing, the state asked the court to "make good on your 
word and send the defendant to the penitentiary today because ... he was given a 
zero-tolerance contract[.]" T pg. 171, ln. 20-23. Defense counsel asked the court to 
reinstate Mr. Standley on probation. T pg. 176, ln. 6-7. 
Before ruling, the court acknowledged that there was no evidence that Mr. 
Standley was "still in the drug business" or that "he's continued to use while he was 
out of jail," but noted that it had made it "absolutely clear that this was a zero 
tolerance probation." T pg. 178, ln. 22 - pg. 179, ln. 13. It also acknowledged to Mr. 
Standley that, "I set you up to fail. And guess what? You failed." T pg. 180, ln. 6. 
It then noted how it knew Danielle Schreiner. She's one of my probationers. 
After many riders, I put her in drug court. And I am particularly offended in this 
case that we had a defendant who was trying to manipulate someone in the drug 
court system." T pg. 180, ln. 15-19. And it asked, "why would anyone who has a 
drug association with Matt Lewis ... ever make a phone call to someone from their 
past? ... [WJhy would a defendant who has totally changed his life, who wants to 
get out of the drug world, go back and start associating with someone who is deeply 
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in the drug world, and he knows it?" T pg. 181, ln. 4-14. The court then 
probation, imposed the life sentence and announced it would not reduce the 
sentence. T pg. 181, ln. 25 - pg. 182, ln. 1. 
A timely Notice of Appeal was filed. R 262. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was there sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Standley violated his 
special term of probation that he not quit his Suboxene treatment program or the 
general term of probation that he meaningfully participate in the Suboxene 
treatment program? 
2. Did the court abuse its discretion in revoking probation and imposing the 
original sentence? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. There was not sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Standley violated his 
special term of probation that he complete his Suboxene treatment or the 
general term of probation that he meaningfully participate in his Suboxene 
treatment program. 
1. Introduction and standard of review 
In general, probation revocation proceedings present three potential issues on 
review: First, was there a probation violation? Second, does the violation justify 
revocation? Third, if revocation is justified, what prison sentence should be 
ordered? State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001). A 
trial court's finding of a probation violation will be upheld on appeal if there is 
substantial evidence in the record to support the finding. Id. This is one of those 
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rare cases where the evidence does not support the court's finding. 
Why relief should be granted 
While the state alleged a violation of both general condition of probation #15 
and special condition (e), R 191, the court only addressed special condition (e) in its 
oral findings. T pg. 113, ln. 11 - pg. 114, ln. 3. However, there was not sufficient 
evidence presented to find Mr. Standley violated either provision. 
First, Mr. Standley did not violate special condition (e) because the 
undisputed evidence was that he was still enrolled in the program and thus had not 
"quit[] the program prior to the completion date recommended by Dr. Hadlock," in 
violation of the special condition. In fact, he was continuing his treatment even 
though he was in custody pending the resolution of the probation violation 
proceedings. (While he had not "complete[d] the Suboxene program," no one argued 
that he should have done so in the time he was on probation.) 
The court only found that Mr. Standley was not in strict compliance with all 
of the terms of the treatment agreement because he wasn't taking all of his 
medication. That fact does not constitute a violation of special condition (e) that he 
not quit and eventually complete Dr. Hadlock's treatment program. Consequently, 
there was insufficient evidence to support Count II. 
Mr. Standley anticipates that the state will be tempted to argue that the 
error above is harmless because there was sufficient evidence to find he violated 
general condition of probation #15, that he "meaningfully participate" in the 
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Suboxene treatment. R 117. Such an argument would be without merit because the 
did not find that Mr. Standley violated that general condition and moreover 
the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support such a finding. To the 
contrary, the evidence was that Mr. Standley was doing a phenomenal job. Further, 
the doctor noted that is not uncommon for patients to forget to take all their 
Suboxene and, when patients miss a dose, they should not try to catch up. Nor is 
missing a dose necessarily a problem. Dr. Hadlock did not expect perfect 
compliance with the treatment agreement; it is not unusual for patients to be 
noncompliant and "some latitude" is given when they have violations of the 
agreement. T pg. 88, ln. 19-20; pg. 89, ln. 4-11. In addition, all of his urine tests 
were clean and he attended IOP aftercare and relapse prevention. And, he was 
attending community support meetings and actually leading some of the meetings. 
T pg. 100, ln. 12-19. In light of the above, any argument that Mr. Standley was not 
meaningfully participating in the treatment program would be frivolous in addition 
to being irrelevant. 
The error is not harmless even though the court found Mr. Standley had 
violated part of Count I by having unauthorized contact with a drug court 
participant. It does not appear from the record that the court would have revoked 
Mr. Standley's probation based solely on that contact and should not have, as is 
explained below. Thus, this Court should vacate the probation revocation and 
remand for further proceedings. 
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The district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and 
iniposing sentence. 
1. Standard of review 
When deciding whether revocation of probation is appropriate, the court must 
consider whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether 
continued probation is consistent with the protection of society. State v. Jones, 123 
Idaho 315, 318, 84 7 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Ct. App.1993); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 
558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App.1988). In reviewing the propriety of a probation 
revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's 
decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618,621, 288 P.3d 835, 
838 (Ct. App. 2012). If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been 
proved, a district court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion. I.C. § 20-222; State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138, 772 P.2d 1231, 
1232 (Ct. App.1989). In determining whether an abuse of discretion has been 
shown, this Court must determine whether the district court acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion, consistent with any legal standards applicable to its 
specific choices, and whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. State v. Bechett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992). An 
appellate court conducts an independent review of the entire record to determine if 
the record supports the district court's decision to revoke probation. State v. Easley, 
156 Idaho 214, 218, 322 P.3d 296, 300 (2014). 
14 
2. Why relief should be granted 
Here the record shows that the court abused its discretion in revoking 
probation and executing the sentence. 
First, the court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards 
because it disregarded both Mr. Standley's rehabilitation and the protection of 
society when it revoked probation. It revoked despite acknowledging that there was 
"no evidence" that Mr. Standley had used any illegal drugs or distributed drugs 
while on probation. T pg. 178, ln. 22 - pg. 179, ln. 2. While the court said it was 
"particularly offended" that Mr. Standley "was trying to manipulate someone in the 
drug court system," T pg. 180, ln. 15-19, its perceived manipulation of Ms. Schreiner 
is not supported by the record. The text message exchange between Mr. Standley 
and Ms. Schreiner was initiated by her. She is the one who texted Mr. Standley with 
the message that she just saw Matt Lewis and he wants to get in touch with Mr. 
Standley, while mentioning Mr. Lewis likes opiates. She forwarded Mr. Lewis' 
number to Mr. Standley without being asked to do so. She, not Mr. Standley, says 
that it "[s]ucks I can't take anything," after complaining that she was "prolly gonna 
pass out" because her "back got fucked today at work[.]" State's Exhibit 1 
(Evidentiary Hearing). If anything, Ms. Schreiner was attempting to manipulate 
Mr. Standley. The same is true for Mr. Lewis, who testified that he had a ten 
minute phone call with Mr. Standley where he was "hinting toward" getting some 
Suboxene but that Mr. Standley didn't take the hint. T pg. 144, ln 16 - pg. 145, ln. 6. 
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Second, its decisions to revoke and impose were not made by the exercise 
reason. Instead, it noted that it had made it "absolutely clear that this was a zero 
tolerance probation," while telling Mr. Standley that, "I set you up to fail. And 
guess what? You failed." T pg. 178, ln. 22 - pg. 179, ln. 13. T pg. 180, ln. 6. 
However, probation is not a game of "mother-may-I?" Certainly, the text messages 
here or a ten minute conversation with a drug user do not amount to a rational basis 
to revoke probation and impose a life sentence, especially when the state has 
acknowledged a life sentence was not appropriate. And, Mr. Standley never 
promised to follow all terms and conditions of the treatment program. He promised 
to not quit, to meaningfully participate and to eventually complete the program. He 
was in compliance with the first two and would have completed the program, had he 
been allowed to. 
The text messages here do not amount to a valid or rational reason to put Mr. 
Standley or the state to the extreme human and large financial cost of a 15 to life 
prison sentence, especially when he was doing phenomenally well in rehabilitation 
and was not distributing drugs. Instead of allowing him to succeed and provide an 
example to others, the court's irrational decision harms both parties with no increase 
in rehabilitation or public safety. It was an abuse of the court's discretion and 
should be vacated. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Wesly Standley asks this Court to vacate the 
order revoking his probation and remand to the district court for further proceedings. 
~ 
Respectfully submitted this~ day of October, 2015. 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Wesly Standley 
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